Using a sample of 161 global banks in 23 countries, we examine the applicability of structural models and bank fundamentals to price global bank credit risk. First, we find that variables predicted by structural models (leverage, volatility, and risk-free rate) are significantly associated with bank CDS spreads. Second, some CAMELS indicators, including asset quality, cost efficiency, and sensitivity to market risk, contain incremental information for bank CDS prices. Moreover, leverage and asset quality have had a stronger impact on bank CDS since the onset of the recent financial crisis. Banks in countries with lower stock market volatility and/or more financial conglomerates restrictions tend to have lower CDS spreads. Deposit insurance appears to have an adverse effect on CDS spreads, indicating a moral hazard problem.
Introduction
Banks took center stage during the recent global financial crisis, which prompted efforts to develop early warning systems that could identify institutions likely to default. As the recent financial crisis shows, one warning sign could be widening credit default swap (CDS) spreads, which usually reflect increased financial stress and default risk, making them early indicators of real failures. In this paper, we explore the determinants of CDS spreads for banks around the world. Are the variables predicted by the structural models, which usually apply to nonfinancial Researchers widely use structural models to price credit risk in corporations. Specifically, leverage, volatility, and risk-free rates are significant determinants of the levels of and changes in corporate yield spreads (Duffee, 1998; Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001, etc.) . Benkert (2004) shows that the structural model can also apply to CDS pricing. Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009) find that leverage, volatility, and the risk-free rate are major determinants of corporate CDS premia using a sample of 94 North American companies from 1999 to 2002. They find that the 3 explanatory power of the theoretical variables for CDS spreads of industrial firms is approximately 60%, which provides further evidence of the credit-spread puzzle indicating that structural variables can only explain a moderate portion of credit-spread variability (Huang and Huang, 2012; Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001) . It is suggested that adding the common systematic risk component and the default probability over business cycles may help to overcome the restraints of the time-invariant assumptions in the structural models (Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001; Chen et al., 2009 ).
Traditionally, researchers exclude banks from empirical investigations in the credit risk literature. Due to special business models, asset-liability structures, and regulatory requirements on capital adequacy, the leverage ratios of banks are generally high and lack in variation. Such limited variation in leverage could exaggerate the credit-spread puzzle in the banking industry.
However, some banks may choose to hold additional levels of capital buffers in excess of the regulatory requirement and hence have lower leverage to reduce the probability that they have to raise costly equity or suffer from exogenous shocks in case they occur (Barth, 2006; Berger et al., 1995; Brewer et al., 2008; Diamond and Rajan, 2000; Flannery, 1994; Tian, Yang, and Zhang, 2013) . Therefore, banks can have optimal leverage ratios cross-sectionally just as nonfinancial firms do. In addition, it has been argued that banks increased their leverage substantially since the lending boom of the early 2000s, which fueled the run-up to the sub-prime crises. Hence, there should be also time-series variations in bank leverage over the past decade. It is ultimately an empirical question to determine whether the relevance of leverage in explaining firm credit risk carries over to financial institutions.
However, the empirical evidence on capital structure outside the U.S. banking industry is limited due to the data availability. Annaert et al. (2013) shows that the Merton-model variables 4 can explain bank credit-spread changes for 31 EU banks. One concern with their empirical estimations is that they use the bank stock return as a proxy for financial leverage. In fact, stock return fails to serve as a direct measure of bank's debt-equity level since it captures both upside and downside movements that might be totally unrelated to the bank capitalization.
In our paper, we construct the market-value based leverage following the credit risk literature, and we examine whether structural variables can explain CDS spreads for financial firms. We find that all three variables are statistically and economically significant for bank CDS spreads and robust to our model specifications. To be specific, a standard deviation increase in leverage is associated with widening of CDS spreads by 110bp, and a standard deviation increase in equity-return volatility is associated with an increase in raw CDS spread of 175bps.
However, the variables predicted by the structural model without controlling for time and bank fixed effects can explain only about 20% of the variation of bank CDS spreads, indicating that the credit-spread puzzle is more evident for banks than corporations.
Alternatively, bank regulators traditionally use the CAMELS rating system, which is based on ratio analyses of financial statements, to monitor banks' overall financial soundness. 2004 -2008 , OtkerRobe and Podpiera (2010 find that business models, earnings potential, and overall economic uncertainty affect bank CDS spreads. However, they caution that the generalization of their results to other banks and countries might require adjustments since their analysis is for European LCFI only, which have limited variations in many aspects.
2 Chiaramonte and Casu (2013) find that bank CDS spreads reflect the risk captured by some bank balance-sheet ratios for a sample of 57 banks, mostly European banks. They also find the accounting measure of leverage (equity/total assets) is not significant. Both studies point out the importance of CAMELS indicators, but they do not consider theoretical determinants of structural models and country-level factors.
With a large sample of 161 large, medium, and small financial institutions in 22 countries spanning 2001-2011, which encompasses both the pre-financial crisis and crisis periods, we test whether the earlier findings for CAMELS can be generalized to a wide range of global banks, and whether CAMELS have incremental explanatory power above and beyond the structural variables. We find that asset quality (measured by loan-loss provisions to total loans), management quality (measured by cost efficiency), and cost of funds (measured by interest expense to total liabilities) are significantly associated with bank CDS spreads, even controlling for structural model variables. Including both structural variables and CAMELS improves the model fit from 20% to 30%, suggesting that structural variables and CAMELS indicators contain complementary information about bank credit risk.
Because our cross-country sample varies widely in terms of economic development, institutions, banking structure, and regulations, we account for those country differences using GDP per capita, stock market volatility, yield slope, country governance, banking concentration, financial conglomerates restriction, entry barrier, and deposit insurance adoption. We find that stock market volatility, which reflects systematic risk and risk aversion, is indeed a significant determinant of bank CDS across countries. This result is also consistent with Tang and Yan 6 (2006) that manifest the significant impact of macroeconomic conditions on credit spread. The empirical literature on credit-spread puzzle relies mostly on time-series data within the U.S.
nonfinancial firms. Our cross-country evidence supports the claim that adding the common systematic risk component helps to address the credit-spread puzzle in bank CDS. 3 In addition, more stringent financial conglomerate restriction in a country is associated with narrower bank CDS spreads, consistent with the findings of Beltratti and Stulz (2012) that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities perform better and cut back on lending less during the recent crisis. However, adopting explicit deposit insurance statistically and significantly increases banks' credit risk. This result is consistent with the "moral hazard"
view that deposit insurance diminishes depositors' incentives and efforts to monitor bank activities, which in turn increases the likelihood of bank default.
Furthermore, we examine the impact of the financial crisis. Our regression confirms that global bank CDS spreads witness a dramatic widening since the onset of the recent financial crisis after controlling for bank and country factors. Moreover, leverage and asset quality have a much stronger impact on bank CDS spread after the crisis.
Our paper contributes to the CDS literature in several ways. First, we test the usefulness of structural variables for pricing bank credit risk. Earlier studies focus on CDS price drivers in industrial companies; we extend the literature by confirming the applicability of structural models to financial institutions. Second, we apply risk measures widely used in the banking industry, CAMELS variables, to examine whether they provide incremental information to price bank credit risk beyond structural variables. Third, our study is based on a comprehensive set of global banks over the past decade. The sample of international banks has greater cross-sectional 7 and time-wise variations relative to earlier studies that focus on a single country or region. Thus, our study should shed light on what drives global bank CDS spreads and whether those factors apply more broadly. In a related cross-country study, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) investigate how bank performance during the crisis is affected by accounting ratios and bank regulations before the financial crisis. While their paper uses during-crisis buy-and-hold stock returns to measure both upside and downside risk, our paper primarily focuses on the downside risk that is captured by the CDS spreads.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature and develops the main hypothesis. Section 3 provides data descriptions. Section 4 discusses research methodology and presents our results. Section 5 concludes.
Hypothesis Development
CDS spreads are a direct and an excellent measure of default risk. The buyer pays a premium (the CDS spread), and the seller agrees to compensate the buyer for any loss in the event that the reference entities (corporations or banks) default. CDSs are homogeneous and standardized contracts. Unlike bonds, there is no need to select a benchmark risk-free interest rate to calculate the credit spread, and there are no short-selling restrictions. Liquidity and tax treatment also have less effect on CDS prices than on corporate bonds (Driessen, 2005) .
Moreover, several studies find that CDS spreads incorporate default-related information in an efficient way relative to the bond and stock markets and the rating agencies (Blanco et al., 2005; Hull et al., 2004; Fung et al. 2008; Norden and Weber, 2004; Rodríguez-Moreno and Pena, 2013) .
A CDS contract allows sellers to collect annual payments, which are quoted in basis points, on a notional bond value of $10 million. In the event that the bond issuer defaults, the 8 buyer will receive full compensation from the sellers. The CDS spread is thus an indicator of credit risk for the underlying entities. For example, the five-year CDS spread for Goldman Sachs widened by 23bp in 2011 from 115bp to 138bp. This means that a contract buyer will pay $138,000 instead of $115,000 every year for the next five years to insure $10 million of Goldman debt against a default.
Structural Model Variables
Structural models of default by Merton (1974) Following the empirical credit risk literature, we use equity return volatility to proxy for assets volatility, which is calculated as the historical standard deviation of bank's daily equity returns in a particular year. We expect that bank CDS spread is positively related to equity return volatility, which increases the default likelihood.
The 10-year government bond yield is used to proxy for risk-free rate (Ericsson et al., 2009 ). 4 Interest rates are positively related to economic growth and negatively related to default likelihood. Therefore a negative relationship is expected between risk-free rate and CDS spreads for a given country. However, the relationship could be positive across countries because banks have higher borrowing costs in countries with greater risk-free rates.
Although credit-risk modeling widely uses structural models, there is a so-called creditspread puzzle; that is, the models are generally unable to explain why they fail to predict the high excess returns corporate bondholders historically receive (Huang and Huang, 2012; CollinDufresne et al., 2001) . The puzzle suggests that either the assumption of time-invariant default probabilities and recovery rates of the Merton model need to be relaxed, or that factors other than default and recovery risk affect credit spreads. Factors could be the variability of risk premiums and the default probability over business cycles.
Collin- Dufresne et al. (2001) suggest that a single market-wide component is the driving force behind historical spreads. Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2009) also show that the credit-spread puzzle can be addressed by adding factors that explain the equity-premium puzzle, such as common systematic risk factors. The credit-spread puzzle in the context of bank credit spread could be more pronounced and more challenging to address, however.
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In turn, we first test whether the factors predicted by structural models are significant determinants of bank CDS spreads. We then attempt to investigate what additional factors explain credit spreads for banks.
CAMELS Indicators
Due to the differing business models between banks and non-financial firms, a bank's loan quality, capital adequacy, asset liquidity position, and cost of funds, among other things, may provide incremental information about its credit risk. Therefore, we account for bank fundamentals using the CAMELS rating system, which bank supervisory authorities traditionally use to classify a bank's overall condition and predict bank failures (Cole and White, 2011; Jin, Kanagaretnam, and Lobo, 2011) . Moreover, we examine whether these bank fundamentals have incremental explanatory power beyond the structural variables.
The six factors of CAMELS system are capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. The system helps regulators identify banks that need attention. The ratings are not public (to prevent bank runs when institutions receive CAMELS rating downgrades). Institutions with deteriorating situations and declining CAMELS ratings are subject to ever-increasing supervisory scrutiny. Failed institutions are eventually resolved via a formal resolution process designed to protect retail depositors.
Although there are several measures to proxy for each element of the CAMELS indicators, we select the most commonly used with the highest number of observations to avoid multicollinearity problems.
5 5 For example, loan-loss provisions to total loans and nonperforming loans ratios are both proxies for asset quality. Their correlations are 47.5%, which is significant at the 1% level. As the first variable has 707 observations and the second has only 630 observations, we use loan-loss provisions in our main analysis. As a robustness check, we also conduct analysis using an alternative set of CAMELS variables, including Tier 1 capital ratios, share of nonperforming loans to total loans, the trading income to total revenue ratio, ROA, and the wholesale funds to total liabilities. The results are similar.
For these reasons, capital adequacy is crucial. It provides a cushion against fluctuations in earnings so that banks can continue to operate in periods of loss. It also supports growth as a free source of funds and provides protection against insolvency. In addition to meeting regulatory capital requirements, maintaining additional capital beyond the statutory requirements is critical for banks to survive during a crisis and better cope with exogenous shocks (Tian, Yang, and Zhang, 2013) . Thus, capital adequacy should be a critical determinant of bank credit risk.
Accordingly, we use Z-scores to measure capital adequacy. Z-score equals the return on assets plus the capital-asset ratio, divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. We expect that Zscore is correlated negatively with the bank CDS spread (i.e., banks with more capital have lower credit risk).
Asset quality measures the quality and trends of all major assets of a bank, such as loans, investments, and other assets that could adversely affect a bank's financial condition. It assesses the bank's management of credit risk, such as the quality of loan underwriting, the ability to properly administer its assets, and the timely collection of problem assets. We use loan-loss provisions to total loans to proxy for asset quality. Banks with higher asset quality (lower loanloss provisions for a bank's problem loans) should have lower credit risk and therefore lower CDS spreads.
Management quality assesses whether a bank can correctly diagnose and respond to financial stress. Quality management can better identify, measure, monitor, and control the risks of a bank's activities and ensure its safe and sound operation with lower credit risk than other banks, all else equal. We use cost efficiency, which is the ratio of operating expenses to total revenues, as a proxy for management quality. We expect this ratio to be negatively related to bank CDS spreads.
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Earnings reflect a bank's income-producing ability. It is essential for a bank to remain viable, fund growth, and sustain and increase capital. Therefore, a bank with higher return on its assets/equity is probably more financially sound and has lower default risk. We use ROE (return on equity) to measure earnings potential. Banks with higher earnings potential should have lower CDS spreads.
Liquidity enables a bank to meet present and future cash flow needs efficiently without adversely affecting daily operations, funding needs, liabilities payments, and survival. We use liquid assets to total assets as proxies for bank liquidity. Presumably, a higher liquid asset ratio should be negatively related to CDS spread. Thus, we expect that CDS spreads correlate negatively with liquid assets to total assets.
The last element of the CAMELS system is sensitivity to market risk, especially interestrate risk, which is the sensitivity of all loans and deposits to relatively abrupt and unexpected shifts in interest rates. We use the ratio of interest expense to total liabilities to measure the bank's liability funding costs as a proxy for interest rate risk. Banks with higher cost of funds are more sensitive to changes in interest rates and therefore are more vulnerable to changes in market conditions. A higher cost of funds may also indicate that a bank has problems in maintaining liquidity and needs to take higher risks in order to cover funding costs. Therefore, we expect that banks with high cost of funds have higher CDS spreads.
Taken together, we expect that banks with lower CDS spreads have higher capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings potential, liquidity position, and lower sensitivity to market risk.
Country-Level Economic, Governance, and Regulation Factors
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Our sample includes a number of countries that are likely to have different business cycles and systematic risk, which should affect credit risk levels and credit risk premia in general and bank CDS spreads in particular. Moreover, banking performance, stability, structure, and regulations are often correlated with economic development (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998) . Therefore, we control for economic-development and market-condition differences across countries using the natural log of GDP per capita, country governance indicator, stock market volatility, and yield slope. We use the country in which a bank is incorporated to assign the country-level variables.
GDP per capita is from the World Development Indicator database (WDI).
6 Country governance indicator is from the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset. Countries with higher GDP per capita are expected to carry lower country risk. We also expect that banks in countries with better governance make better risk-taking decisions and have lower default probability (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012) . Stock market volatility is the historical standard deviation of a country's stock index in a particular year. Lower stock market volatility indicates less economic uncertainty, lower default risk, and credit risk premia (Tang and Yan, 2010) . Slope of the yield curve is calculated as the difference between the return on 10-year government bonds and the return on two-year government bonds. A higher slope of the yield term structure is generally associated with better economic growth prospects and lower default risk. Therefore, we expect banks to have lower CDS spreads if they are domiciled in a country with higher GDP, lower stock market volatility, and higher slope of yield.
Finally, we also include in our analysis bank concentration, regulation and restriction, and deposit-insurance systems. We measure bank industry concentration as the fraction of bank assets held by the five largest commercial banks in the country. We compute this using the Bankscope database. 7 Banks would earn monopoly rents in more concentrated banking systems and thus are less likely to take more risks (Gorton and Rosen, 1995) . However, more concentrated banking systems could also carry greater systemic risks. Indeed, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that the worst-performing banks during the financial crisis come from countries with higher bank concentration. So it is an empirical question to test the relationship between bank concentration and CDS spreads.
Following Barth et al. (2004 Barth et al. ( , 2006 Barth et al. ( , 2008 , we use two measures to proxy for a country's bank regulation and restriction. The first variable, financial conglomerates restriction, measures the extent to which banks may own and control nonfinancial firms, the extent to which nonfinancial firms may own and control banks, and the extent to which nonbank financial firms may own and control banks. A higher index value indicates that the country's banking regulation favors traditional banking rather than financial conglomerates. The second variable, entry barrier, is the fraction of bank entry applications denied. Lax regulation would lead banks to take more risks and undergo poor performance. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that the betterperforming banks come from significantly more tightly regulated countries (more restrictions on banking activities), so we expect a negative relationship between bank CDS spreads and restriction.
The last variable is the deposit insurance scheme, which aims to prevent banking runs and promote financial stability, but which may also lead to moral hazard problems. Our information on deposit insurance is collected from the "Comprehensive Deposit Insurance around the World" dataset of the World Bank and the 2010 annual survey results of International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI, www.iadi.org). We construct a dummy variable, Explicit, which equals 1 if a country has an explicit deposit insurance system, and 0 otherwise. The deposit insurance system can lead to banks taking higher risks, so its relationship with bank CDS spread is ambiguous.
Data
Our bank CDS spread data is from MarkIt, which provides comprehensive coverage for over 3,000 firms and banks around the world. This database is widely used for research on CDSs. Because CDSs are over-the-counter contracts, their maturities are negotiable; they range from a few months to 10 years or more, although five years is the most common horizon. In this paper, we use only five-year spreads because these contracts are the most liquid and constitute over 85% of the entire CDS market.
We then carefully match the name of the bank CDS entities to Fitch-IBCA Ltd's Bankscope via a combination of algorithmic matching and manual checking. 8 Bankscope provides the most comprehensive bank-level world-wide data set with balance sheet and income statement information for both public and private banks across a wide range of countries.
These procedures render a sample of 968 bank-year observations for 222 banks in 26
countries from 2001 to 2011. 9 The lack of bank stock return data in some cases reduces the sample to 707 bank-year observations for 161 banks in 23 countries during the sample years. As stock return volatility and leverage are key determinants of CDS spreads according to the structural model, most of our analysis is based on this main sample (707 observations). We also conduct robustness checks using the expanded sample of 968 observations for the models with no structural variables.
As discussed, CAMELS ratings consider capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings potential, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. We use Z-score to measure capital adequacy, loan-loss provisions as a percentage of total loans to measure quality of bank assets, cost efficiency to proxy for management quality, ROE to capture earnings potential, and liquid assets as a percentage of total assets to gauge liquidity/funding position. 10 Then we use alternative indicators for each CAMELS category as a robustness check. United States has 46 banks in our sample, followed by Japan with 25 banks, Italy with 13 banks, Germany with 11 banks, and Australia with 10 banks. Other countries have fewer than 10 banks, including China, which has four banks in our sample.
[Insert 
Empirical Methods and Results
We conduct a multivariate panel data regression with the natural log of CDS spread as the dependent variable, which is stationary using the unit-root test. Independent variables include bank structural variables, CAMELS indicators, and country economic and regulation variables as control variables. The model is as follows:
where CDS is the natural log of CDS spread for bank i at year t; X represents the structural variables predicted by theory, leverage, volatility, and risk-free rate for bank i at year t; Y represents the CAMELS indicators for bank i at year t; and Z represents country-level economic and governance indicators, bank industry concentration level, and bank regulation variables at year t. Our data is a pooled time series and cross-sectional unbalanced panel data.
We use bank fixed effect to account for unobserved time-invariant bank characteristics and time fixed effect to account for unobserved time-varying factors. Moreover, CDS spreads for a given country are likely correlated over time; hence, we adjust for country clustering effect, following Petersen (2009).
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Our analysis proceeds in step wise approach. We start with the model with structural variables only, then move to the model with CAMELS indicators only. Then we test the model with both structural variables and CAMELS variables. Finally, we include country-level variables to account for variation across countries.
Models with Structural Variables Only
The structural model (Merton, 1974) links the prices of credit-risky instruments directly to the economic determinants of the likelihood of default (i.e., financial leverage, volatility, and the risk-free term structure). To examine the explanatory power of the structural variables, we also report a panel regression without the time and bank fixed effects.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the regression results for leverage only. In Model 1 in which the dependent variable is the year-end CDS spreads and no fixed effects are controlled, the coefficient on the market value based leverage measure is 0.031 (t=3.22), consistent with the prediction by structural model. Similarly, the coefficient is 0.029 (t=2.73) when the dependent variable is the average of CDS spreads over a year. Models 3-4 control for year and bank fixed effect, in which leverage remains positively related to the log of year-end CDS spread and the log of year-average CDS spread. While banks have a narrower leverage distribution than corporate firms, leverage appears a significant determinant of CDS spreads. 12 Thus our initial evidence suggests that a bank with higher leverage is associated with greater credit risk, and leverage is useful to price credit risk not only for industrial firms, but also for financial institutions. 12 As shown in Table 2 , the average of leverage ratio for our sample banks is 0.90, with standard deviation of 0.09. The 1st and 99th percentile values are 0.56 and 0.99. This is in contrast to the wide leverage-ratio distribution for corporate entities. Next, we investigate all three variables predicted by structural models in Panel B.
Leverage is positive and significant in Models 1-4. In terms of economic magnitude, a standard deviation increase in leverage is associated with an increase in CDS spread of 110bps (=the exponential of (0.014×6.74)) in Model 1. The coefficients for equity-return volatility are positive and strongly significant across the four models, confirming that banks with higher volatility have higher CDS spreads. The economic magnitude is also significant. An alternative explanation is that there is a spillover effect from sovereign bonds to bank bonds.
In terms of model fit, the structural variables per se explain approximately 22% of the variation in the log of year-end CDS spreads in model 1, corroborating earlier evidence that structural models can only explain a limited percentage of spread variation. In comparison, the structural model explains 52%-66% of corporate CDS spreads in Ericsson et al. (2009) . This suggests that the credit-yield puzzle is more pronounced for banks than for industrial corporations. After controlling for the time and bank fixed effect, the adjusted R-squared 21 increases to 60%. Therefore, incorporating time-varying factors and cross-sectional variations should help to resolve the credit-spread puzzle.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Models with CAMELS Indicators Only
Next, we investigate whether bank CDS spreads can timely reflect CAMELS indicators.
We expect that banks with higher capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings potential, and liquidity have lower CDS spreads, and that banks with greater sensitivity to market risk have higher CDS spreads. Table 4 presents the results. Models 1-4 are based on the main sample and Models 5-6 are based on the expanded sample.
The coefficients on loan-loss provisions to total loans ratio, cost efficiency, and cost of funds are all positive and significant across most models. ROE is negatively related to log of the CDS spread. Liquidity is not significantly related to CDS spreads when the bank and time fixed effects are accounted for. The adjusted R-squareds of Models 1 and 2 using the six CAMELS indicators are about 20%, comparable to the explanatory power of three structural variables in Table 3 (Model 1). For the expanded sample, bank CDS spreads are significantly associated with loan-loss provisions to total loans ratio and cost of funds.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Models with Both Structural Variables and CAMELS Indicators
To show whether the accounting variables provide incremental explanatory power in addition to the structural variables, we include both structural variables and CAMELS indicators in the regressions as shown in Table 5 . Several observations are noted.
First, leverage and volatility are positive and significant, which is robust to model specification. Government bond yield is positive and significant when the time effect is 22 controlled for, consistent with the Table 3 result. Second, among accounting variables, the impact of loan-loss provisions is positive and significant across all models. Using the year-end CDS spreads and year-average CDS spreads provide similar results. Third, for the panel regression with no fixed effects in Models 1 and 2, the adjusted R-squareds are 0.30 and 0.36, respectively, which are about 50% higher than when only structural variables or only CAMELS elements are used. Therefore, we could improve the model fit by incorporating both the market information impounded in structural variables and the bank fundamentals, especially asset quality.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Models Controlling for Cross-Country Variation in Economic Factors, Bank
Concentrations, and Regulations
Because our sample is based on 161 banks across 23 countries in different regions, we need to control for the impact of country-level factors. Key country economic indicators in our analysis include log of GDP per capita, country-level stock market volatility, country governance, slope of bond yield, bank concentration, bank regulation proxied by financial conglomerate restriction and entry barriers, and the adoption of explicit deposit insurance.
In Model 1 for the main sample, we find that the results on three structural variables hold after controlling country and bank regulation factors. In addition, some country-level variables affect bank CDS spreads. Banks generally have higher CDS spreads in a country with greater stock market volatility, fewer financial conglomerate restrictions, and explicit deposit insurance scheme. Our results provide cross-country evidence that systematic risk and risk premia in a country, as proxied by stock market volatility, is important for credit risk pricing for global banks.
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In terms of bank regulation, we find that banks in countries with greater restrictions face lower default risk, consistent with the findings of Beltratti and Stulz (2012) that banks in countries with more restrictions on bank activities perform better and decrease loans less during the recent crisis. The coefficient on explicit deposit insurance dummy is positive and significant at the 1% level. Deposit insurance is generally intended to protect the country's banks by avoiding bank runs. However, it may also lead to moral-hazard problems. Because banks have limited downside risk and unlimited upside potential with the protection of deposit insurance, they may take greater risks and reduce the capital available to generate more profits. 13 The positive sign of explicit deposit insurance dummy suggests that the adverse impact from moral hazard dominates its intended positive impact of promoting financial stability.
We include CAMELS variables in model 2. Among CAMELS, Loan loss provisions, cost efficiency, and cost of funds are significant and have the expected sign.
In Model 3 for the expanded sample, government bond yield, bank loan-loss provisions, and cost of funds remain significant determinants of bank CDS spreads. The coefficients on the three country-level factors, stock market volatility, financial conglomerates restriction and explicit are both economically and statistically significant.
[Insert Table 6 here]
The Impact of Crisis
To investigate the impact of the financial crisis on determinants of bank CDS spreads, we add a dummy variable, crisis, and the interaction terms in our model. Crisis equals 1 if the sample year is 2007 or after; it equals 0 otherwise. The structural variables and CAMELS indicators are interacted with crisis. To avoid multicollinearity problems, we demean main 24 variables by subtracting the mean from the raw value before constructing the interaction terms.
The results are presented in Table 7 .
[Insert Table 7 here]
In Model 1 for the main sample, the coefficient on the banking crisis variable is positive and significant (1.216, t=2.404), confirming that the bank CDS spread is significantly higher since the onset of the financial crisis. The coefficient on the interaction term between leverage and crisis is positive and significant (0.015, t=2.339), suggesting that the adverse impact of leverage on CDS spreads during the crisis is stronger than the pre-crisis period. So there is an additional widening of CDS spreads for banks with high leverage during the financial crisis. We also find that the coefficient on the interaction term between loan-loss provisions and crisis is positive and strongly significant. So the impact of asset quality plays a substantially more important role with the onset of the recent financial crisis, which also holds for the expanded sample as shown in Model 2.
Conclusion
Global banks experienced a relatively stable period over the first half of the 2000-2010 decade, though turmoil of course eventually ensued. For this reason, credit default spreads for banks, which are excellent measures of default risk and early warning signals, deserve more research efforts.
Existing studies investigate the determinants of U.S. corporate bond-yield spreads and CDS spreads. However, banks differ from corporations in their business models and risk-taking behaviors and regulations, among other things. It is not clear, therefore, whether structural models apply to financial firms. Prior studies that focus on bank CDSs in a country, region, or 25 certain period likely involve samples with very little variation in bank fundamentals and market environments.
Our study evaluates the effects of both structural variables and balance-sheet ratios on bank CDS spreads, while controlling for business, market conditions, and regulation environment over time and across countries. Based on a panel data of 161 bank CDS spreads across 22 countries, we find that the market-value based leverage measures, equity return volatility, and government bond yield are all significant determinants of bank credit risk. This lends support to the applicability of structural models for financial institutions. However, the low model fit with structural variables of about 20% suggests that the credit spread-puzzle is more pronounced for financial firms than industrial firms. CAMELS indicators provide incremental explanatory power beyond structural models. A model fit with both structural variables and CAMELS indicators reaches 30%. Asset quality is the most significant determinant of bank CDS spreads after controlling for time and bank fixed effect.
In addition, stock market volatility is positively and significantly associated with bank CDS spreads, which provides cross-country evidence that systematic risk and risk aversion are important in pricing bank credit risk. Financial conglomerate restriction is negatively related to bank CDS spreads, implying that competition helps to reduce bank credit risk. Banks in countries with deposit insurance tend to have higher CDS spreads. This is likely due to more risk-taking behaviors. With time and bank fixed effects, our model fit increases to 60-80%. So cross-bank variations in systematic risk and some unobserved time-varying factors have important explanatory power for bank CDS spreads. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the recent financial crisis on bank credit risk. The impacts of leverage and asset quality on CDS spreads are much stronger for banks during the crisis. 26 Taken together, our study sheds light on the applicability of structural models and bank fundamentals to price global bank credit risk. This study should help policymakers around the world develop early warning systems and associated supervisory norms for financial institutions. 
CDS Spread
The 5-year CDS spreads in basis points. To maintain uniformity in contracts, we only keep CDS quotations for senior unsecured debt with a modified restructuring clause. CDS spread is the year-end CDS quote, and CDS spread_mean is the average of the daily CDS spread over a year.
MarkIt Bank Assets
The book value of a bank borrower's total assets, in millions of U.S. dollars.
Bankscope
Log(Z-score) Z-score equals the return on assets plus the capital-asset ratio, divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. Because the Z-score is highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of the Zscore as the risk measure (following Laeven and Levine, 2007) .
Bankscope Leverage Book value of liabilities to the sum of book value of liabilities and market value of equity.
Bankscope, Bloomberg
Volatility
The historical standard deviation of bank's daily equity returns in a particular year.
Bloomberg
Government bond yield The 10-year government bond yield.
Global insights
Tier 1 capital The ratio of capital (shareholders capital, reserves, and hybrid capital to certain limits) divided by risk-weighted assets. This is reported by each bank.
Bankscope
Loan-loss provisions to total loans
The ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans. Bankscope
Share of nonperforming loans to total loans
The ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. Bankscope
Cost efficiency
The ratio of operating costs to revenues. Bankscope
Trading income to total revenue ratio
The ratio of trading income to revenues. Bankscope ROE Net income divided by total common equity. Bankscope ROA Net income divided by total assets. Bankscope
Liquid assets to total assets
The ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Bankscope
Wholesale funds to total liabilities
The ratio of wholesale funds to total liabilities. Bankscope
Cost of funds
The ratio of interest expense to total liabilities. Bankscope Log(GDP per capita) The natural log of GDP per capita. WDI
Stock market volatility
The historical standard deviation of a country's stock index in a particular year.
Bloomberg Slope
The return on 10-year government bonds minus return on twoyear government bonds.
Global insights
Country governance The country governance indicator.
Worldwide Governance Indicators Bank industry Concentration
The fraction of bank assets held by the five largest commercial banks in the country.
Bankscope
Financial conglomerates restriction
An indicator measuring the extent to which banks may own and control nonfinancial firms, the extent to which nonfinancial firms may own and control banks, and the extent to which nonbank financial firms may own and control banks. Barth et al. (2006 Barth et al. ( , 2008 Entry Barrier
The fraction of bank entry applications denied. Barth et al. (2006 Barth et al. ( , 2008 Explicit A dummy variable that equals 1 if the borrower's country has an explicit deposit insurance system; it equals and 0 otherwise.
World Bank, and the 2010 annual survey results of International Association of Deposit Insurers
